B O RY S

9
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University Press, 2021. Pp. 372.
John A. English in Monty and the Canadian Army successfully
argues that Bernard Montgomery exerted a significant influence over
the Canadian Army during the Second World War as well as in the
years following the conflict. English clearly shows how Montgomery
had both a direct and indirect influence on the development of First
Canadian Army at various points throughout the war: from helping
plan operations that Canadian soldiers took part in, to dispensing
leadership lessons to Canadian officers and even reviewing Canadian
units and providing feedback on the quality of Canadian officers and
other ranks. English further shows how in the post-war years several
Canadian disciples of Montgomery rose to senior positions within
the Canadian Army and thus Montgomery’s teachings and influence
continued. The book is the first of its kind to provide such an
impressive and well-written examination of Montgomery’s influence
over the Canadian Army and is an important contribution to both
Canadian Second World War historiography and to the volumes of
work already written on Montgomery.
The opening four chapters of the book succinctly identify the
origins of Montgomery’s command doctrine while also detailing the
declining professionalism of the Canadian Army during the interwar
years. English effectively presents Montgomery’s command doctrine
as one that emphasised extensive training as well as an approach
to battle that stressed saving lives through meticulous planning. He
then shows how much of this command doctrine was adopted by First
Canadian Army. The Canadian Army was clearly unprepared for war
in 1939 and, argues English, even by 1941 it still was not ready for
a role which many hoped would be like that of the Canadian Corps’
impressive Hundred Days Campaign in 1918. As English explains, the
quality of the Canadian Army began to improve when Harry Crerar,
only recently appointed commander of the then Canadian Corps,
accepted Montgomery’s offer to conduct a review of Canadian troops.
This was carried out in February and March 1942 and Chapters
6 and 7 detail this process and are perhaps the most effective in
showing Montgomery’s influence over the army. Chapter 6 is devoted
to a detailed account of this review with many of Montgomery’s
recommendations for personnel replacement implemented in the
aftermath. Chapter 7 then explains that while Montgomery thought
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of Canadians as first-rate troops, he lamented their lack of training
and the general weakness of Canadian officers (though he certainly
identified some excellent officers such as Guy Simonds). Many of
Montgomery’s recommendations regarding increased training and
better tactics were adopted by Crerar and his subordinates throughout
First Canadian Army. From Chapter 8 onwards, English details
Canadian operations in Hong Kong, Dieppe, Italy and throughout
northwest Europe, ably displaying how Montgomery both directly
and indirectly played a role in shaping Canadian operations.
There is no question that English is effective in showing how
Montgomery had a continued and impressive influence over both the
development of the Canadian Army and its operational history during
the war. From Dieppe to the Netherlands, Montgomery seemed to
have a part to play in almost everything the Canadian Army did.
The only issue one might take with English’s work is that of a lack
of balance in his approach to his subjects. English is highly critical of
First Canadian Army commander Harry Crerar throughout the book
and even when Crerar finally grasped army-level operations during
the battles for the Rhine, English is limited in his praise. Conversely,
criticisms of Montgomery are generally absent. English spends little
time on any of Montgomery’s well-known errors or misjudgments. Most
surprising is that he almost completely ignores Montgomery’s fault
in failing to reinforce First Canadian Army during the operations to
clear the Scheldt. Instead, English blames Crerar’s decision to assign
II Canadian Corps responsibility for the entire area from Boulogne
to Antwerp instead of accepting Montgomery’s suggestion that John
Crocker’s I Corps control operations in that area, leaving II Canadian
Corps to focus on Antwerp (pp. 178-180). Historians with more
knowledge of Montgomery than this reviewer may take umbrage with
the way English has uncritically assessed Montgomery’s leadership.
However, it must be pointed out that this book was not intended to
be a biography of either Montgomery or Crerar.
What this book intended to do, and what it achieves, is to
shed incredibly important light on Montgomery’s influence over
the Canadian Army during both the war and post-war period. Of
particular interest to this historian was Montgomery’s early influence
on the Canadian Army as it was expanding, training and conducting
exercises in Great Britain prior to the invasion of northwest Europe.
As well, English’s novel discussion of Montgomery’s influence in the
decade and a half after the war is an incredibly important addition
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to our understanding of the development of the Canadian Army in
the Cold War years. This book, like most of English’s work, is wellwritten and well researched and is a must read for any historian
attempting to better understand the Canadian Army from 1939 to
1961 and is a welcome addition to the historiography of Canada’s
Second World War.
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